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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine thousands of plaintiffs sue a single defendant or a small number
of defendants. Imagine further that these plaintiffs all request thousands of
documents. They interpose thousands of interrogatories. The thousands of
plaintiffs all want to take the depositions of the same few individuals.
Fortunately, the federal judicial system has a mechanism to coordinate the
pretrial process in order to conserve the time and resources of the parties
involved and of the judiciary.
But when the pretrial process is complete, these thousands of actions
remain. Does it then make sense to cut off the coordinated process that had
been so logical? Is it wise to remove the actions from the judge that has
become most familiar with the case throughout discovery? When parties
want to continue the litigation in that district, should they then have to
undertake costly procedural steps to return the case to the transferee district,
rather than simply remaining there after discovery? This is the frustrating
result currently in place in the federal court system. This is the result that
needs to be amended.
The first multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was
passed in 1968 in response to the growing need for consolidating pretrial
proceedings in mass tort cases.1 In cases involving actions for mass disasters
like airplane crashes and products liability, where thousands of plaintiffs sue
a single defendant or a small number of defendants, efficiency and the
interest of justice favor the consolidation of cases for discovery proceedings.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the "Panel") was formed to
oversee the transfer and remand of cases to a transferee district.2
* J.D. Candidate, expected 2009, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law;
B.S. summa cum laude, 2006, Cornell University.
1 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3861 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE]. The goal of § 1407 is to provide centralized management of pretrial
proceedings to avoid conflict and duplication in discovery and other pretrial procedures
in related cases. Id.
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2008). The Panel consists of seven circuit and district
judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United States. § 1407(d). A concurrence of
four members of the Panel is necessary for any action to be taken by the Panel. Id.
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Section 1407 provides for the transfer of an action to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings when actions with one or
more common questions of fact are pending in different districts.3 Transfer is
appropriate for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in order to
promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions.4 Each transferred action
is to be remanded to its originating district by the Panel at or before the
conclusion of pretrial proceedings unless it is previously terminated.5
For the first thirty years after it was passed, § 1407 enabled cases to be
transferred to the "transferee district" for consolidated pretrial proceedings. 6
The Panel then, as directed by § 1407, remanded the cases to the originating
district for trial. 7 However, transferee judges frequently followed a more
efficient course of action, such as granting a motion to dismiss or a motion to
transfer the case permanently to the transferee district.8 During this period,
3 The statute provides:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending
in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial
panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that
transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so
transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated: Provided, however, [tihat the panel may separate any
claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such
claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may be initiated by--
(i) the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation upon its own initiative, or
(ii) motion filed with the panel by a party in any action in which transfer for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under this section may be
appropriate. A copy of such motion shall be filed in the district court in which the
moving party's action is pending ....
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
4 Id. § 1407(a).
5 Id.
6 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 3866.2.
7 See id.
8 Id.; see Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1971) (recognizing that
§ 1407, in dictating only the powers of the Panel, did not prevent transferee judges from
controlling the path of transferred cases). The practice of self-transfer was sanctioned by
the Rules set forth by the Panel. "Each transferred action that has not been terminated in
the transferee court shall be remanded by the Panel to the transferor district for trial,
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this practice of "self-transfer" under § 1404(a) by the transferee judge was
quite common. 9
In 1998, the Supreme Court prohibited this procedure of self-transfer in
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach.10 The Court
interpreted the word "shall" in § 1407 as mandating the remand of the
transferred cases by the Panel to the originating districts after the completion
of pretrial proceedings." Transferee judges no longer had the power to
transfer cases to the transferee district or other districts of the parties'
choice. 12
As a result of the Lexecon bar to self-transfer, current practice often leads
to judicial inefficiency and complicates the procedural course of the action
after discovery. One effect of Lexecon has been to vastly increase the number
of actions that are remanded.13 Now, several thousands of actions, rather than
the hundred or so prior to Lexecon, are remanded each year for trial. 14 The
rigidity of the mandatory remand system defeats the efficiency goals of
multidistrict litigation by preventing simple permanent transfers and thereby
encouraging litigants to engage in time-consuming procedural hassles so that
the case may be heard by the appropriate judge.
Part II will begin with an overview of the purpose of multidistrict
litigation and § 1407. Part III will discuss the routine use of self-transfer for
the first three decades of MDL practice, followed by a review of the Lexecon
case and how it has negatively impacted the judicial process. Part IV of this
Note will analyze the many procedural hurdles that litigants go through in
unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other district under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406." J.P.M.L. RULE OF PROCEDURE 14(b), 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (1976), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. 1981). The rule expressly
stated that an order of remand would not be necessary if the transferee judge granted a
§ 1404(a) or 1406 motion.
This rule was later overturned, in part, to prevent the transferee judge from granting
self-transfer or transfer to another district. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes
& Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998); J.P.M.L. RULE OF PROCEDURE 7.6(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1998), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2001).
9 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 n.9 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (recognizing that in practice, as of June 30, 1986, over two-thirds of the
15,026 actions that had been transferred pursuant to § 1407 were terminated by the
transferee district without remand).
10 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
11 Id. at 35 (citing Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)).
12 Id. at 40.
13 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 185, 191
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-
1898, MDL 1358, 2005 WL 106936, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005)).
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order to achieve the desired forum, among other things, for the adjudication
of their cases. Congress has been active in proposing legislation over the last
decade to reverse the effect of Lexecon to eliminate the need for such hassles,
but no such change has been enacted to date, as will be discussed in Part V.
This Note will then argue in Part VI the merits of a new proposal for
legislative reform that would improve the multidistrict litigation process to
achieve litigants' desired result.
II. PURPOSE OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
When many cases of the same type involving a similar claim are filed
throughout the country, they can be transferred to a single district to
coordinate discovery. 15 This transfer "prevent[s] duplication of discovery and
eliminates the possibility of conflicting pretrial rulings."'16 The Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, established by 28 U.S.C. § 1407, is an inter-
district body that reviews the cases and orders the transfers. 17
Section 1407 proceedings for the transfer of an action to a transferee
court may be initiated by the Panel itself or upon a motion filed with the
Panel by a party desiring this transfer. 18 An action transferred under this
section "shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it
shall have been previously terminated ....
Remand usually occurs upon the recommendation of the transferee court,
though the transferee court itself does not have independent discretion under
§ 1407 to remand an action.20 In accordance with the overall purpose of
§ 1407 of ensuring judicial economy, a main factor in determining when
remand is appropriate is "when remand will best serve the expeditious
disposition of the litigation." 21 After remand, the transferor court regains
exclusive jurisdiction over the action.22
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2008).
16 In re Liquid Carbonic Truck Drivers Chem. Poisoning Litig., 423 F. Supp. 937,
939 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (citing In re Radiation Incident at Washington, D.C. on Apr. 5,
1974, 400 F. Supp. 1404, 1406 (J.P.M.L. 1975)) (granting the transfer of several actions
involving common issues of fact regarding the causation of the plaintiffs' injuries and the
liability of the defendants).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2008).
18 Id. § 1407(c).
19 Id. § 1407(a).
20 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 (4th ed. 2004).
21 Id.
22 Following remand, the transferor court oversees further pretrial proceedings as
needed and presides over the remainder of the adjudication process. Id.
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The purpose of § 1407, however, is more about efficiency and fairness
than remand. The "clear language, corroborated by the legislative
history,... and by testimony before Congress of its authors, makes it clear
that [§ 1407's] remedial aim is to eliminate the potential for conflicting
contemporaneous pretrial rulings by coordinate district and appellate courts
in multidistrict related civil actions. '23 Section 1407 and multidistrict
proceedings are important for achieving a balance between the competing
interests of efficiency and fairness. 24 One significant feature of multidistrict
proceedings is that they "bring before a single judge all of the federal cases,
parties, and counsel comprising the litigation. They therefore afford a unique
opportunity for the negotiation of a global settlement. '25 The types of cases
where § 1407 transfer is usually appropriate are "antitrust, securities, air
disaster, other common disaster, patent, copyright, trademark and products
liability."'26 Hundreds or thousands of actions relating to the same incident
may be brought, and multidistrict proceedings offer a means by which these
cases may proceed efficiently and in fairness to all involved. Duplicative
discovery is avoided, time and money are saved, and the possibility of a
global settlement is increased.
The need for consolidated pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigation
became apparent in 1961 when more than 2,000 antitrust actions were filed
in thirty-five federal districts against manufacturers of electrical equipment.27
These actions presented previously-unseen issues of coordination and
maximizing judicial efficiency.28 The Judicial Conference of the United
States created a subcommittee of judges to oversee the pretrial proceedings
of these actions, and this laid the foundation for Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, created in 1968.29
23 In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 490-92 (J.P.M.L. 1968). "[T]o
qualify for transfer, civil actions must meet three criteria: [F]irst, they must involve one
or more common questions of fact; second, they must be pending in more than one
district, and third, pretrial consolidation must promote the 'just and efficient conduct' of
such actions and be for 'the convenience of parties and witnesses."' In re Ivy, 901 F.2d 7,
9 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. REP. No. 90-1130 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1898, 1900).
24 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 3868.
25 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 20, § 20.132.
26 Robert A. Cahn, A Look at the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72
F.R.D. 211,214 (1977).
27 James M. Wood, The Judicial Coordination of Drug and Device Litigation: A
Review and Critique, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 325, 326 (1999).
28 Id.
29 Id.
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Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has acted upon 265,268 civil actions
pursuant to § 1407, as of September 30, 2007.30 The following table provides
a cumulative summary of multidistrict litigation from 1968 through
September 30, 2007. 3 1
Cumulative
Totals as of
September 30, 2007
Total Actions Subjected to Section 265,268
1407 Proceedings
Actions Transferred 202,601
Actions Originally Filed in Transferee 62,667
Districts
Total Terminations 188,408
Actions Terminated by Transferee 176,405
Courts
Actions Reassigned to Transferor 393
Judges Within Transferee Courts
Actions Remanded by the Panel 11,610
Total Actions Presently Pending and
Subjected to Section 1407 Proceedings 76,860
That multidistrict litigation has had a tremendous impact on the federal
judicial system is clear from the hundreds of thousands of actions that have
been affected. Repeatedly, courts and the Panel have recognized the benefits
of transfer to the MDL, including judicial economy and overall efficiency.32
While the importance of § 1407 is widely accepted, the remand procedure is
not. The next section discusses MDL practice since its creation in 1968 and
the varying levels of acceptance of the remand procedure over the last forty
years.
30 James C. Duff, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 2007 Annual Report
of the Director, Table S-20, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.
31 Id.
32 See id. The sheer volume of transfers pursuant to § 1407 reflects the awareness of
courts and the Panel of the benefits to be gained by transfer to the MDL.
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III. FORTY YEARS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRACTICE
This section reviews the history of multidistrict litigation in action. For
the first thirty years of MDL practice, it was quite common for the transferee
judge to grant §§ 1404(a) and 1406 motions.33 In 1998, however, the
Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes
& Lerach stripped the transferee courts of the ability to grant these transfers
and held that § 1407 mandates remand by the Panel to the transferee court. 34
Since 1998, courts have generally applied the Lexecon result and have
explored the limits of its holding.
A. Self-Transfer from 1968-1998
For the thirty year period between 1968 and 1998, the Panel directed
thousands of cases to transferee districts in multidistrict litigation.35 It was
common during that time for many cases transferred under § 1407 to remain
in the transferee district for trial. Transferee judges frequently entered orders
for permanent transfer of these cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 1406.36
This practice, though not entirely consistent with the language of § 1407, was
endorsed by the Panel. The Panel enacted its own procedural rules that
provided for self-transfer. 37 Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Rule of
Procedure 14(b) provided for each transferred action to be remanded by the
Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless the transferee judge ordered
self-transfer to the transferee district or transfer to another district under
33 See supra notes 8 & 9.
34 523 U.S. 26,40 (1998).
35 Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 1998
Annual Report of the Director, Table S-22, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbususc/judbus.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). As of September 30, 1998, 140,867
actions had been subjected to § 1407 proceedings. Id.
36 Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 32-33 (recognizing the popularity of the "self-transfer"
practice in conjunction with § 1407).
Transfer of venue motions under §§ 1404(a) and 1406 allow for permanent transfer
of an action with no need to remand. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008); "The district
court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or
division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2008).
37 The Panel is authorized to prescribe rules for conducting its business so long as
those rules are not inconsistent with the Acts of Congress or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(0 (2008).
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§ 1404(a) or 1406.38 With that sanction in the Rule itself, it was more
common that the action remain in the transferee district than be remanded to
its originating district: "[H]istory has indicated that once the limited transfer
has occurred, the transferor district is not likely to see the case again."39
Thus, with a discrepancy between § 1407 and the Rule promulgated under
the statute, courts often followed the procedure sanctioned by the Rule.
During pretrial proceedings under § 1407, the transferee district judge
possessed control over all aspects of discovery. 40 Such powers included
scheduling discovery on a variety of issues, staying discovery on a particular
issue until remand, ruling on the sufficiency of pleadings, and making results
of completed discovery available to other parties in related actions.4 1
Granting motions for change of venue was also a routine aspect within a
transferee judge's power in multidistrict litigation.42 Using 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) or 1406, a transferee judge could permanently transfer the action to
the transferee court or to another court. 43 With these statutes, the transferee
judge's power is limited by venue considerations in that venue must be
proper in the district to which the action is sent.44 The Second Circuit's
opinion in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord was a noteworthy opinion approving the use of
a § 1404(a) motion in transferee courts.45 With the support of many courts
38 J.P.M.L. RULE OF PROCEDURE 14(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1993) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2001)) (invalidated by Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes
& Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)). Rule 14(b) was adopted in 1993 as a substitute for former
Rule 15(d), which also recognized the authority of the transferee judge to rule on a
§ 1404(a) motion. The Panel has thus supported the validity of self-transfer since 1970,
when Rule 15(d) was promulgated. See Benjamin W. Larson, Comment, Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach: Respecting the Plaintiff's Choice of Forum, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1337, 1345 (1999).
39 In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 572 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1978).
40 See Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor
Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 579 (1978).
41 Id. at 579-80.
42 "The power of a transferee judge to order transfer of those actions for all purposes
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or § 1406 is an accepted procedure in multidistrict
practice." Id. at 581.
43 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406 (2008).
44 See id. The action may only be transferred under these statutes to any district
where it might have been brought. Id.
45 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971). The court held that a transferee judge, to whom
cases are transferred by the Panel under § 1407, has the power to issue transfer orders
under § 1404(a). Id. at 125. The court stated that § 1407 applies to the powers of the
Panel, not to the powers of the transferee judge. Id. at 124. While § 1407 restricts the
Panel from granting a § 1404 or 1406 motion, this restriction does not apply to the
transferee judge. Id.
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and the Panel itself, during this first thirty year period, "[m]ost actions [were]
terminated either in the transferee district, (often by settlement) or [were]
transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee district or to another
district for trial pursuant to Sections 1404(a) or 1406.' '46 It was clear that this
practice best supported judicial economy, in accord with the purpose of
§ 1407.
Strong policy considerations support the pre-1998 practice.47 First, the
transferee judge gained a solid understanding of the case throughout the
extensive discovery process.48 It made sense for trial to be conducted by the
judge with the greatest understanding of the case. Second, the transferee
judge would often try the constituent centralized actions, and it was
sometimes more efficient to adjudicate related actions in one trial. 49 Lastly,
the transferee judge, when empowered to try the centralized actions, had a
greater ability to facilitate a global settlement.50
The pivotal Supreme Court ruling in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach eliminated the possibility of the transferee court
The Panel itself has noted that "[s]ections 1404(a), 1406(a), and 1407 are not
mutually exclusive and, when appropriate, should be used in concert to effect the most
expeditious disposition of multidistrict litigation." In re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239, 242
(J.P.M.L. 1969).
In Pfizer, Judge Miles Lord ordered a § 1404 transfer to his district of all remaining
cases in the MDL over which he was presiding. The Second Circuit affirmed this self-
transfer, noting that allowing transferee judges to grant §§ 1404 and 1406 motions
"would clearly seem to comport with the esential [sic] purpose of section 1407 to
'promote the just and efficient conduct' of complex multidistrict litigation." Pfizer, 447
F.2d at 125. The court reasoned that the transferor court has no authority to grant a
§ 1404 motion while the case is subject to the § 1407 transfer for coordinated pretrial
proceedings, and to prevent the transferee court from granting such motions would be to
delay these transfer motions during the entire pretrial period. See id. "The inevitable
result would be further extensive delay in litigation which already is among the most time
consuming to appear on the federal dockets. We see no reason to sanction such a result."
Id.
46 Weigel, supra note 40, at 583. In the first ten years after § 1407 was enacted, less
than five percent of the actions transferred by the Panel were remanded. Id. This figure
suggests how common and useful settlement and self-transfer were in managing the court
docket by eliminating the need for remand to the originating district and efficiently
disposing of and transferring cases.
47 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 20, § 20.132.
48 Id. "After spending weeks, or even months, governing pretrial stages of a matter,
a judge acquires an unparalleled familiarity with the litigation. This familiarity can
enhance the smooth and speedy processing of cases through trial." Blake M. Rhodes,
Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 711, 731 (1991).
49 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 20, § 20.132.
50 Id.
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directing the transfer of cases upon completion of discovery.51 The Court
held that a transferee court under § 1407 must return each case to the Panel,
and the Panel will remand the case to its originating district for disposition
after the coordinated pretrial phase is complete.52 "[T]he Supreme Court
overturned three decades of uniform case law that allowed transferee courts
to retain cases for trials through the practice of a 'self-transfer' under
section 1404... ." -53 While the policy concerns for the pre-1998 practice
remain, the Lexecon ruling invalidated the previously common practices.
B. The Lexecon Case in 1998 and a Reversal of Thirty Years of
Practice
In Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,54 the
Supreme Court finally addressed the discrepancy between § 1407, which
mandates the remand of cases to the transferor district, and Multidistrict
Litigation Rule 14(b), which allowed the transferee judge to transfer cases to
itself or to any other district. 55 In that case, Lexecon, Inc., a law and
economics consulting firm, brought claims of malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, tortious interference, commercial disparagement, and defamation
against the law firms of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (Milberg)
and Cotchett Illston & Pitre (Cotchett).56 This action stemmed from the law
firms' conduct as counsel in a prior class action for violations of securities
and racketeering laws. 57 Lexecon was a defendant, and the case had been
transferred under § 1407(a) for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona
with the consolidated cases known as the Lincoln Savings litigation. 58
Lexecon was ultimately dismissed in that suit, and brought its action
against Milberg and Cotchett in the Northern District of Illinois.59 Milberg
and Cotchett filed a motion under § 1407(a) with the Panel for transfer to the
51 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998).
52 Id.
53 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358,
2005 WL 106936, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005).
54 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
55 Rule 14(b) enabled transferee judges to grant § 1404 or 1406 motions, and when
these actions were transferred, the Panel was no longer involved in authorizing further
proceedings. In re Carbon Dioxide Indus. Antitrust Litig., 229 F.3d 1321, 1323 n.4 (1 th
Cir. 2000).
56 Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 28-29.
57 1d. at 29.
58Id.
59 Id.
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District of Arizona for consolidation with the Lincoln Savings litigation.60
The motion was granted.61 As discovery progressed, Lexecon moved the
court for the District of Arizona to recommend to the Panel that the case be
remanded to the Northern District of Illinois.62 The defendants filed a
countermotion under § 1404(a) requesting that the District of Arizona
"transfer" the case to itself for the duration of discovery and trial.63
Ultimately, the law firms' § 1404(a) motion was granted. 64 The remaining
issues of the case were tried in the District of Arizona and judgment was
entered for Milberg and Cotchett.65 Lexecon then appealed to the Ninth
Circuit. The circuit court affirmed on the ground that permitting a transferee
court to assign a case to itself was consistent with statutory language and also
conducive to efficiency.66 The Supreme Court reversed and held that a
transferee court has no authority to assign a transferred case to itself for trial
under § 1404(a).67
The Court determined that § 1407 obligates the Panel to remand any
pending case to its originating court.68 The requirement that the Panel
remand to that court is mandatory, as emphasized by the use of the word
"shall" in the statute: 69 "Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the
panel ... .-"70 The Court added that "[i]f we do our job of reading the statute
whole, we have to give effect to this plain command, even if doing that will
reverse the longstanding practice under the statute and [Panel Rule 14(b)]."'71
None of the arguments raised by Milberg and Cotchett could "unsettle the
straightforward language imposing the Panel's responsibility to remand,
which bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court and
consequently entails the invalidity of the Panel's Rule 14(b)." 72
60 Id.
6 1 Id. at 30.
62 Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 30.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 31.
65 Id. at32.
6 6 Id.
67 ld. at 38-40.
6 8 Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 40.
69 Id. at 35.
70 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
71 Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 35 (internal citations omitted).
7 2 Id. at 40.
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C. The Effect of Lexecon on Multidistrict Litigation Practice and
Procedure
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Rules of Procedure were
revised to match the Lexecon holding prohibiting transfer by the transferee
judge. Former Rule 14(b), which was invalidated in Lexecon, was removed.
Rule 7.6(b) was amended to reflect the ruling in Lexecon and provides that
"[e]ach action transferred only for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings that has not been terminated in the transferee district court shall
be remanded by the Panel to the transferor district for trial."' 73 Unlike former
Rule 14(b), no language permits the transferee judge to transfer a case under
§ 1404 or 1406.74 This language is now consistent with § 1407.
While the Lexecon case specifically involved only self-transfer by a
§ 1407 transferee court, the Supreme Court suggested that the language of
§ 1407 would also bar a transferee court from granting a § 1404(a) motion to
transfer a case to any court.75 Based on the "Supreme Court's interpretation
of the mandatory remand language, there is no apparent reason that the
Lexecon ruling would not bar a § 1404 transfer to a court other than the
transferee court. Under the Supreme Court's analysis, either type of transfer
would run afoul of the mandatory remand language." 76
Subsequent cases have upheld Lexecon. In In re Roberts, the court
addressed the question of whether the authority to remand a transferred case
can lie with the transferee district judge.77 The court held that "§ 1407(a) and
Lexecon indicate that the power to remand a transferred case to the transferor
court lies with the Panel, not the transferee district judge."78 Though not all
courts agree that mandatory remand is proper, they recognize that the
Lexecon holding that the Panel's obligation to remand at the completion of
pretrial proceedings is "impervious to judicial discretion." 79 The Panel does
73 J.P.M.L. RULE OF PROCEDURE 7.6, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (effective 1998).
74 See supra Part III.A.
75 See Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 41 n.4.
76 In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc., Equip. Lease Litig., No.
1:02-CV-16001-KMO, at *36 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2007) (order denying Sky Bank's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
77 In re Roberts, 178 F.3d 181, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).
78 Id. at 184. Section 1407 places on the Panel the mandatory obligation to remand a
transferred case to the transferor court. Id. (citing Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 34). While the
power to remand lies with the Panel, "[Panel Rule 14(c)] clearly states that the Panel
must consider remand on the suggestion of the transferee district judge." Id.
79 See, e.g., In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Lexecon, 523
U.S. at 35) (acknowledging that remand is mandatory at the conclusion of pretrial
proceedings but denying to comment on the soundness of the mandatory remand
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have discretion, however, to determine whether remand is appropriate prior
to the conclusion of the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.80
The Third Circuit recognized that the Lexecon Court "concluded that a
§ 1404 transfer order was outside the scope of the transferee court's authority
because a 'necessary consequence of self-assignment by a transferee court [is
that] it conclusively thwarts the Panel's capacity to obey the unconditional
command of § 1407(a)."' 81 That court held, however, that conducting
settlement conferences in the transferee court does not "conclusively thwart"
the Panel's ability to remand and is therefore within the transferee court's
power.82 The transferee court does have the authority to decide the entire
case summarily at the pretrial stage. 83
The courts and litigants have come to accept that Lexecon prohibits
transferee judges from granting §§ 1404(a) and 1406 transfer motions
outright. This does not mean, however, that they are satisfied with the result.
Litigants have devised several procedural mechanisms by which they can get
around the undesired result of remand to the transferor court or make the best
of the remand situation.
V. PROCEDURAL ATTEMPTS To AVOID LEXECON
The Lexecon ruling has produced some inefficient consequences, but in
some cases, parties have found ways to circumvent those consequences. The
Lexecon mandate, in essence, can be subverted as litigants attempt to steer
the course of the action. Various practices and procedures exist, such that a
particular case, for example, may go to trial in the transferee court or be
procedure); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, MDL
1358, 2005 WL 106936, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005) (acknowledging but criticizing
the Lexecon mandatory remand procedure).
80In re Wilson, 451 F.3d at 172-73 (expressing frustration with the remand
procedure in that the court was bound by the Panel's reluctance to suggest remand prior
to the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, which "continue[d] to limit [the court's] ability
and inclination to decide otherwise at this time").
81 In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Lexecon, 523 U.S. at
36).
82 Id.
83 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir.
2006). The transferee court is responsible for overseeing the coordinated and
consolidated pretrial proceedings, and in order to do so effectively, the court must rule on
a variety of pretrial motions, including those that may be dispositive.
However, African-American Slave Descendants is to be read "narrowly as
authorizing a transferee court.., to decide only motions to dismiss and other potentially
dispositive pretrial motions, and not to preside over the trial itself." Armstrong v. La
Salle Bank, No. 01 C 2963, MDL 1417, 2007 WL 704531, at *3 (N.D. Ill. March 2,
2007).
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bound by the outcome of other cases in the coordinated pretrial proceedings.
While these procedures do enable litigants to have their case heard in the
district they choose, these options may be appropriate only in limited
circumstances. Therefore, these alternatives are insufficient for alleviating
the burdens established by Lexecon and § 1407, and greater reform is
necessary so that litigants do not need to undergo these procedural hassles.
This section reviews these procedures.
A. Transfer Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 as an Alternative to § 1407
Transfer to the Desired Transferee District
A civil action pending in a district court and involving common
questions of fact with actions previously transferred under § 1407 is a "tag-
along action."'84 Before discovery, if a case may be a tag-along, the parties
are advised to notify the Panel, who will consider formal designation of the
case as a tag-along and transfer it pursuant to § 1407.85
As an alternative, the parties to such a case may move the district court
itself to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the transferee
district.86 Then, the case will be in that district permanently and need not be
remanded to the transferor district.87 For this transfer to be appropriate,
however, the moving parties must show that the transfer is for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.88
Venue must also be proper.89
Some courts have found § 1404 transfers of related actions to be
appropriate. 90 With this type of transfer, the related cases from the transferee
84 J.P.M.L. RULE OF PROCEDURE 1.1, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2008). When an action is
similar to cases currently pending in multidistrict litigation, the action may be transferred
to the existing MDL under § 1407. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2008).
85 See J.P.M.L. RULES OF PROCEDURE 7.4, 7.5, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2008).
86 "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008).
87 Section 1404(a) provides for permanent transfer of the action. The Panel has no
control over an action transferred through § 1404; a § 1404 transfer "makes it impossible
for the Panel to remand even though the action has not been terminated .... " In re
Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2000).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008). In addition to reasons of the convenience of parties
and the interest of justice, some courts also grant a transfer to avoid inconsistent results.
See, e.g., Schecher v. Purdue Pharma, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262 (D. Kan. 2004).
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008).
90 See, e.g., LeMaster v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. Civ.A. 04-147-DLB, 2004 WL
1398213, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 18, 2004) (citing In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 314 F.
Supp. 2d 1388 (J.P.M.L. 2004)). By way of background, in In re Oxycontin Antitrust
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district and the case transferred under § 1404(a) are pending in the same
district, but are not consolidated and not necessarily before the same judge,
which is a downside of § 1404(a) transfer when done only to avoid § 1407. 91
When the number of related actions grows too large, however, courts and the
Panel deny § 1404(a) motions in favor of consolidating the cases with the
transferee district under § 1407.92 The Panel has stated that transfer under
§ 1407 is more appropriate because it has the "salutary effect of placing all
actions in this docket before a single judge who can formulate a pretrial
program that ensures that pretrial proceedings will be conducted in a manner
leading to the just and expeditious resolution of all actions to the overall
benefit of the parties." '93
Though a § 1404 transfer allows litigants to circumvent the Lexecon
remand requirement, this procedure is not always available. For example,
when the number of actions to be transferred is large, the Panel may decide
that consolidation on the docket of a single judge is better than transferring
all of the actions just to a particular district under § 1404, where any judge
could receive the case.94 In such instances, the parties may be bound by the
mandatory remand. Aside from this potential obstacle, § 1404(a) also
specifies particular requirements for transfer, and these conditions are not
always met. First, § 1404 can only be invoked if transfer is for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. 95 Second,
transfers are also inappropriate when the transferee district is an improper
Litigation, forty-one tag-alongs related to the LeMaster v. Purdue Pharma action were
transferred to the Southern District of New York by the Panel pursuant to § 1407. In re
Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d at 1390. In In re Oxycontin Antitrust
Litigation, the Panel decided that § 1407 transfer was preferable to § 1404(a) transfer
because under § 1407, all of the transferred actions would be placed in front of a single
judge who could best coordinate pretrial proceedings. Id.
Defendants in LeMaster, the moving party for the § 1404(a) transfer, had already
notified the Panel of this action as a tag-along, but decided that rather than wait for the
Panel to determine that this case too was a tag-along, the district court itself could grant a
§ 1404(a) motion more immediately. LeMaster, 2004 WL 1398213 at *1. The Eastern
District of Kentucky went through the traditional § 1404(a) analysis and concluded that
§ 1404 transfer was appropriate. Id.
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008).
92 See, e.g., In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1388 (J.P.M.L. 2004).
93 Id. at 1390. It is likely that the LeMaster district court (discussed supra note 90)
decided that transfer under § 1404 was adequate because the court was considering a
single case. With the forty-one cases in In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litigation, the Panel
decided that § 1407 transfer was best "[g]iven that the number of related actions
continues to grow, along with the potential need for additional motions to transfer
venue." Id.
94 See discussion supra note 93.
95 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008).
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venue. 96 If the related action could not have been brought in the transferee
district due to the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, 9 7 the litigants
may be unable to achieve permanent transfer and instead may have to face
§ 1407 and mandatory remand.
When successful, § 1404 transfers to the transferee district allow the case
to remain in that court, whereas cases transferred only temporarily pursuant
to § 1407 must be remanded by the Panel at a greater expense to the parties
and witnesses. Though § 1404(a) transfers provide parties with an option for
a permanent way to remain in the transferee district for trial, this mechanism
is not always available and is not always successfully invoked. Parties may
be denied § 1404(a) transfer when venue is inappropriate or the number of
cases to be transferred is too great. As such, the § 1404 transfer mechanism is
insufficient to alleviate the burden of the mandatory remand procedure in
multidistrict litigation.
B. Consent to Venue or Consent to Trial in the Transferee District
Parties may stipulate that venue is proper in the transferee district or
consent to hold the trial in the transferee court.98 This mechanism eliminates
the need for remand and re-transfer to the transferee district.99 The Panel
recognized that the Lexecon Court "did not foreclose all possibility that a
transferee judge could try an action that had been transferred to him or her
under section 1407 so long as the parties waived their entitlement to remand
under section 1407."100 The Lexecon decision does not inhibit parties' ability
to waive the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Instead, "[i]t is clear
from the Court's opinion in Lexecon that section 1407 is not a jurisdictional
limitation, but rather 'a venue statute that... categorically limits the
authority of courts (and special panels) to override a plaintiffs choice [of
96 Transfer may only be "to any other district or division where [the action] might
have been brought." Id.
97 For general venue provisions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2008).
98 Solis v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 1:04-CV-17363, 2006 WL 266530, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio, Feb. 1, 2006) (citing Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 284-85 (6th Cir. 1998)),
amended, 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that because § 1407 is a venue statute,
which is "critical because 'venue is personal and waivable[,]' . . . a plaintiff may decide
not to raise an otherwise-valid objection to venue and 'consent to remain in the transferee
district for trial"').
99 William J. Martin, Reducing Delays in Hatch- Waxman Multidistrict Litigation, 71
U. CHi. L. REv. 1173, 1192 (2004).
100 In re Brand-Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1372,
1377 n.4 (J.P.M.L. 2003); see also In re Carbon Dioxide Indus. Antitrust Litig., 229 F.3d
1321, 1326 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (allowing parties to stipulate to trial in the transferee court
when their actions had been transferred pursuant to § 1407).
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forum]." ' 101 However, as the pretrial process carries on, parties may realize
that remaining in the transferee district for trial better suits their situation,
and stipulating that venue is proper achieves the parties' interests while still
respecting the plaintiff's choice of forum.
Though a viable option, this mechanism has not gained the favor of
many jurisdictions. 10 2 It has been suggested that this method is improper and
courts may deny parties the ability to stipulate to venue.10 3 At the very least,
even if courts do not allow parties to consent to trial in the transferee district,
and the case is remanded, parties can still stipulate that venue is proper in the
transferee district in hopes of facilitating a § 1404 or 1406 transfer back to
that district after remand. Again, though, these procedural hassles imposed
by Lexecon burden parties by adding to the time and expense of the
litigation.
C. Stipulation to be Bound by the Outcome in "Bellwether" Cases
Another mechanism for the retention of transferred cases is by agreement
to be bound by "bellwether" trials of a centralized action originally filed in
101 In re Carbon Dioxide Indus. Antitrust Litig., 229 F.3d at 1326. During the early
1990s, the Panel transferred consolidated cases to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida under § 1407. Id. at 1322. Upon the conclusion of pretrial
proceedings, the parties agreed that the cases would remain in the Middle District of
Florida for trial. Id. After the transferee court held for the defendants (and after the
Lexecon opinion was issued), the plaintiffs requested relief from judgment on the grounds
that the cases should have been remanded to their original districts pursuant to § 1407. Id.
at 1325. The issue in the case was whether the Lexecon decision invalidated the
stipulation that venue was proper and the parties' request that the transferee district try
their cases. Id. at 1324. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the
grounds that these cases were distinguishable from Lexecon in that the parties in the
Carbon Dioxide cases failed to raise the issue of remand until the day of jury selection
and had stipulated that venue was proper. Id. at 1326. In contrast, Lexecon requested
remand early in the case and continuously objected that the remand procedure had not
been followed. Id. (citing Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523
U.S. 26,43 (1998)).
102 "The scarcity of jurisdictions to condone this tactic suggests that it has not yet
entered the judicial mainstream." Martin, supra note 99, at 1192. Additionally, the
Eleventh Circuit suggested that this stipulation practice may not always be successful;
though the court permitted stipulation to venue in this case based on the parties' actions
throughout pretrial proceedings, the court also recognized that it may have been error for
the transferee court to refuse to suggest remand to the Panel. In re Carbon Dioxide Indus.
Antitrust Litig., 229 F.3d at 1326.
103 Martin, supra note 99, at 1192.
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the transferee district. 10 4 Under current practice, cases transferred pursuant to
§ 1407 are remanded to their originating districts following coordinated
pretrial proceedings. Attorneys in the remanded cases can then stipulate that
they will be bound by the result in bellwether trials pending before the
transferee judge. 10 5 Under this method, randomly selected representative
actions, the bellwethers, are adjudicated in the transferee district.106 The
related actions that had been remanded are then bound by the outcome in
those cases. Trials are still held for those remaining actions, but issues such
as causation and liability, which were determined in the bellwether trial, are
already decided and binding.
This method carries several advantages. First, the parties who wanted to
remain in the transferee district for trial essentially benefit from the
adjudication process in the transferee district, in that the outcome of the case
in the transferee district controls the outcome in the remanded cases. The
costs of subsequent trials in the transferor district are thus conserved greatly
as many of the main issues are already determined and need not be re-tried.
The results of the bellwether trial are beneficial in providing information
about the value of the cases as determined by a jury verdict. 10 7 This
information aids both sides to an action in achieving fair and favorable
settlements. Thus, the trial in the originating districts often are less likely to
occur because the parties can come to more intelligible settlements. This
stipulation provides an expeditious way of determining some or all of the
major common issues of the coordinated cases in a relatively small number
of trials. 108
Despite these advantages, the remanded cases must still go through the
procedural hassles of remand and then wait for the outcome in the bellwether
cases. Those pending remanded cases must then have their own trials. This
104 "The term bellwether is derived from the ancient practice of [placing a bell
around the neck of] a wether (a male sheep) ... to lead [the] flock. The ultimate success
of the wether selected to wear the bell was determined by whether the flock had
confidence that the wether would not lead them astray, and so it is in the mass tort
context." In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997).
105 See In re Welding Fume Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1:03-CV-17000, MDL 1535,
2006 WL 2869548, at *1 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 5, 2006); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 3866.2.
106 In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1019. The key to a bellwether trial is that the selected
cases that are tried must be representative of all the actions. In order to achieve its goals
of determining causation and liability, as well as the value of the case, in a way that is
meaningful to "the universe of claimants," "the sample must be a randomly selected one
of sufficient size so as to achieve statistical significance to the desired level of confidence
in the result obtained." Id.
107 Id.
10 8 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 3866.2.
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process can be greatly minimized by allowing all cases to remain in the
transferee district for trial. Additionally, the method of selecting the
appropriate cases for the bellwether trials may unduly increase the role of the
courts in justly and efficiently processing cases. A trial court may only use
the results from bellwether trials when the court finds that the tried cases
were representative of the larger group of cases from which they were
selected. 109 In order to make this determination, the court must find
"competent, scientific, statistical evidence that identifies the variables
involved and that provides a sample of sufficient size so as to permit a
finding that there is a sufficient level of confidence that the results obtained
reflect results that would be obtained from trials of the whole." 10 Of course
this requirement is logical because it insulates the cases from due process and
fundamental fairness concerns, but this extra work imposed upon the trial
court can be avoided if the cases were simply permitted to remain in the
transferee district for trial.
D. Dismiss and Refile in the Transferee District
A self-explanatory option for getting the action to the district of choice is
that the plaintiff can dismiss the case and refile the action in the transferee
district. Though this method is relatively simple, it does not come without
challenges."' It imposes the added expenses of time and money that could
be avoided if self-transfer to the transferee district was permitted.
Additionally, venue must be proper in the transferee district. The defendant
may also need to agree to this option in order to waive venue if it is improper
in the new district or if the statute of limitations has run.1 12
E. Transferor Court Transfers Action Back to Transferee Court After
Panel Remands
After the Panel remands the action to the originating district following
pretrial proceedings, the parties may move the originating district to transfer
the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or 1406 to the transferee district."l 3 The
transferee court can facilitate this transfer by recommending it when it
109 In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1020.
l10 Id.
111 See John F. Nangle, From the Horse's Mouth: The Workings of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 341, 345 (1999).
112 Id.
113 Thomas J. McLaughlin & Adam N. Steinman, The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act's Impact on Major Accident Litigation, 34 FALL BRIEF 16, 21 (2004).
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suggests remand to the Panel."14 At this point, the transferor court will go
through its standard § 1404(a) analysis of ensuring that (1) venue is proper in
the transferee district, (2) transfer is for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, and (3) transfer is in the interest of justice. 115 If the motion is
granted, the moving party is then in the district of choice for trial, whether it
be the transferee district or another district altogether.
Though this method is also relatively simple and complies with Lexecon,
it creates such a hassle for litigants that an easier, more direct route to the
transferee court should be established. This "compulsory and mechanical
series of transfers impairs the statute's underlying purpose of enhancing
judicial economy." ' 16 Instead of going through these procedural hoops to
ultimately return the case to the transferee court, the action should be able to
remain in the transferee court instead of being remanded by the Panel.
F. Intercircuit or Intracircuit Assignment of Transferee Judge to
Preside Over Trial in Originating District
The transferee judge could request an intercircuit or intracircuit transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 292 or 294 in order to preside over the trial of a remanded
action in its originating district."l 7 The chief judge of the district or circuit to
which the transferee judge would be transferred must certify the need for
transfer to the Chief Justice of the United States. 1' 8 The Chief Justice would
then order the transfer.
This procedure has the benefit of allowing the transferee judge to hear
the actions that he has become familiar with throughout the course of pretrial
proceedings. Intercircuit and intracircuit transfer, however, is a "cumbersome
and inefficient procedure." 1 9 This process is much more complicated and
time-consuming than simply transferring the cases directly to the transferee
judge's trial docket.
These procedural hassles are a necessary evil in order for litigants to
achieve their goals of the litigation, but the current system conflicts with the
purpose of multidistrict litigation of enhancing judicial economy. With
numerous methods available by which litigants technically abide by
114 Nangle, supra note 111, at 345.
115 Altamont Pharm., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 94 C 6282, 2002 WL 69495, at *2
(N.D. 11. Jan. 18, 2002) (holding that an originating district may grant a § 1404(a) motion
following remand by the Panel).
116 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 3866.2.
117 Nangle, supra note 111, at 345.
118 28 U.S.C. § 292(d) (2008).
119 Martin, supra note 99, at 1193.
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Lexecon's mandatory remand yet work around the remand to land the case in
the forum or before the judge of their choice, it is perplexing that this
absurdity has been allowed to continue for ten years without reform of
§ 1407. Congress has long recognized the need for a Lexecon reform, but to
date, no such reform has been enacted.
V. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND INACTION
In Lexecon, the Supreme Court recognized that the procedure for remand
established in that case may be undesirable or inefficient.' 20 Justice Souter,
writing for the Court, noted, however, that "the proper venue for resolving
that issue remains the floor of Congress." 121 With this suggestion from the
Court, Congress has been active in writing legislation to reverse the
mandatory remand result of Lexecon, but legislation to that effect has not yet
been passed into law.
After the Lexecon decision in 1998, the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the policymaking arm of the federal judiciary, requested that
Congress amend § 1407 to remove the mandatory remand requirement and
permit transferee judges to retain cases for trial. 122 In response to these
requests, among others, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts investigated the MDL situation.123
Members of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation itself have also
spoken out that reform of the Lexecon result is necessary. United States
District Judge John F. Nangle, former Chairman of the Panel, testified before
the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on
the Judiciary that the mandatory remand procedure is "a cumbersome,
repetitive, costly, potentially inconsistent, time consuming, inefficient and
wasteful utilization of judicial and litigants' resources." 124 In support of this
position, he wrote that based on his experience as Chairman of the Panel over
several years, he has come to know that both plaintiff and defense counsel
have agreed for the most part that self-transfer is a useful practice in handling
120 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40
(1998). "Milberg may or may not be correct that permitting transferee courts to make
self-assignments would be more desirable than preserving a plaintiff's choice of venue
(to the degree that § 1407(a) does so)." Id.
121 Id.
122 Marcia Coyle, Bill to Fix 'Lexecon' Sought in Congress, Issue is Handling of
Multidistrict Cases, NAT'L L.J., Jul. 19,2006, at 1, 18.
123 Id.
124 Hearing on H.R. 2112 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 56 (1999) (statement of the Honorable
John F. Nangle, Chairman, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
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MDL dockets. 125 United States District Judge William Terrell Hodges,
another former Chairman of the Panel, told the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee that amendment to § 1407 is "vital" for three reasons: first, to
facilitate settlements; second, to reduce waste of judicial resources due to
litigating these cases in multiple jurisdictions; and third, to curb the
uncertainties, delays, and expense that parties have experienced due to
unnecessary duplication of litigation or inconsistent results in similar cases
from different jurisdictions. 126 Hodges also presented to the subcommittee
the statements of twenty-seven transferee judges who were dissatisfied with
the effect of Lexecon on their multidistrict litigation docket. 127
Bills to amend § 1407 have been considered in various forms since the
101st Congress in the early 1990s. The House of Representatives has been
more active in drafting legislation to serve as a Lexecon "fix." Representative
James F. Sensenbrenner (R-WI), then Chairman of the Committee on the
Judiciary, introduced the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 1999 to amend § 1407 to authorize a judge to whom a
case is transferred in multidistrict litigation to retain jurisdiction for trial. 128
The House recognized that Lexecon has created significant problems that
"have hindered the sensible conduct of multidistrict litigation" and drafted
this legislation with the objective of improving the Lexecon result. 129 The bill
was passed in the House in September 1999. A month later, Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-UT) introduced the Multidistrict Jurisdiction Act of 1999 (the
Senate's name for the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction
Act of 1999) as S. 1748 into the Senate. 130 This bill was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, where it passed with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute. 131 The Senate's amendment to the
House bill struck most provisions not relating to overturning Lexecon, and
the House disagreed with this action. 132 The House, however, agreed to go to
conference on the proposed legislation and appointed conferees, but the
125 Nangle, supra note 111, at 346.
126 Coyle, supra note 122, at 18.
127 Id.
128 Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 2112,
106th Cong. (1999).
129 H.R. REP. No. 106-276, at § 2 (1999).
130 Multidistrict Jurisdiction Act of 1999, S. 1748, 106th Cong. (1999).
131 Id
132 Stephen R. Stegich & David P. Yates, MDL Consolidation of Aviation Disaster
Cases Before and After Lexecon, 67 DEF. COuNs. J. 226, 234 (2000).
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Senate did not agree to a conference. 133 As such, this would-be Lexecon fix
was never passed by both houses. 134
Rep. Sensenbrenner later authored H.R. 860 during the 107th Congress
to undo Lexecon. 135 This legislation would also have had the effect of
codifying the pre-Lexecon procedure of allowing the transferee court to
preside over transferred actions for trial. 136 This bill passed in the House but
died in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 137 The House of
Representatives has upon multiple occasions passed its version of the
"Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act," which would allow a judge, to
whom a case is transferred for pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigation,
to retain jurisdiction over the case for trial. 138 Both the 2003 and 2005
versions of the Act also specify that a transferee court which retains
jurisdiction over referred actions for trial may only make determinations
regarding compensatory damages if it is convenient to the parties and
witnesses and promotes the interest of justice.139
These bills were designed in response to Justice Souter's admonition to
reverse the effects of the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1407 in
Lexecon. This bill would "function as a technical fix to a recently-enacted
'disaster' litigation statute from the 107th Congress. The bill would save
133 Id.
134 Ultimately, Congress did pass a version of the Multidistrict, Multiparty,
Multiform Trial Jurisdiction Act in 2002, but this version did not include any provision to
amend § 1407. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
273, § 11,020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826-29 (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1391, 1441,
1697, 1785 (Supp. 2003)). The removal of the Lexecon-related material may have been
an intentional result of negotiations between the House and the Senate, but this removal
is also somewhat mysterious. Angela J. Rafoth, Congress and the Multiparty, Multiforum
Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002: Meaningful Reform or a Comedy of Errors?, 54 DUKE L.J.
255, 279 n.106 (2004). The effect of the removal of the § 1407 amendment has reduced
the effectiveness of the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act in that the
transferee court still cannot retain the consolidated cases for trial.
135 See 151 CONG. REc. H2120 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005) (discussing the history of
Rep. Sensenbrenner's proposal to reverse the Lexecon ruling). Rep. Sensenbrenner made
several attempts to pass such legislation, the first being during the 105th Congress.
136 Id.
137 On a side note, the "disaster litigation" portion of H.R. 860 was resurrected and
passed during House-Senate conference deliberations on the Department of Justice
Authorization Act in 2002 and is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1369. See 151 CONG. REC.
H2120 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
138 Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. (2004);
Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1038, 109th Cong. (2005).
139 Id. Ordinarily, a case tried in the transferee district would be remanded to the
transferor district for the determination of compensatory damages.
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litigants time and money... ."140 Rep. Sensenbrenner submitted the House
Report that states that "since Lexecon, significant problems have arisen that
have hindered the sensible conduct of multidistrict litigation. Transferee
judges throughout the United States have voiced their concern to the [Panel]
about the urgent need to clarify their authority to retain cases for trial.'' a l
The Report went on to point out that actions in multidistrict litigation "should
be streamlined... by providing the transferee judge as many options as
possible to expedite trial when the transferee judge, with full input from the
parties, deems appropriate. In other words, there is a pressing need to
recreate the multidistrict litigation environment that existed before
Lexecon." 142 The 2003 version was passed by the House during the 108th
Congress by a rollcall vote of 418-0.143 On March 25, 2004, the bill was
referred to the Senate and died in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 144
The Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005 was identical to the
2003 version. The House again reported that for approximately thirty years
before Lexecon, the transferee district courts often invoked § 1404 to retain
jurisdiction for trial, and this process had worked well since the transferee
court was well-versed in the facts and law of that litigation.145 The bill stated
that "there is a pressing need to recreate the multidistrict litigation
environment that existed before the Lexecon decision."' 146 The bill passed in
the House on April 19, 2005. The next day, the bill was referred to the Senate
and directed to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 147 Again, the bill died
at the adjournment of Congress at the end of the session.
While the House was considering passage of the Multidistrict Litigation
Restoration Act and similar legislation multiple times consistently over the
years, the Senate's attempts to amend Lexecon were more sporadic. Finally,
in 2006, Senator Hatch introduced the Multidistrict Litigation Restoration
Act of 2006 in the Senate. 148 Senator Hatch recognized the problems with the
Lexecon result that had long been acknowledged by the House of
Representatives and practitioners, judges, and commentators. Like the House
version, S. 3734 would allow the transferee judge to transfer the case for
140 H.R. REP. No. 108-416, at 3 (2004).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 151 CONG. REc. H2121 (daily ed. Apr. 19,2005).
144 Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. (2004).
145 Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1038, 109th Cong. § 2
(2005).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 152 CONG. REC. S8272 (daily ed. July 26, 2006).
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trial. Senator Hatch stated this amendment to current law would "return the
law to what was in effect for almost three decades prior to the Lexecon
decision. It will provide the MDL Panel with the most efficient option for
resolving complex issues, the best means to encourage universal settlements,
and the most consistent approach for rendering decisions."' 149
After proposal of this bill, it was read twice and referred to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary. 150 No further action was taken on this bill. As of
the writing of this Note, no legislation to amend multidistrict litigation
procedure and § 1407 is pending in Congress.
Now that a decade has passed since the Lexecon decision reversed the
standard that had operated successfully over the thirty year period, real
reform is necessary. Congress has been toying with the idea of reform for far
too long. Perhaps what Congress needs is a fresh proposal, one that is simple
yet directly implements the desired reform while still respecting plaintiffs'
choice of forum, the convenience of the parties, and the interest of justice.
VI. A CALL FOR REFORM
Members of the legal community, including Congressmen, judges, Panel
members, practitioners, and scholars, have also identified the need to amend
§ 1407. This section begins with a recognition of statements and appeals of
such individuals of the importance of a change of the Lexecon result. Then
this Note advances a new proposal for reform of the Lexecon decision that
would create a system similar to the pre-Lexecon status quo yet account for
concerns with unbridled transfer under §§ 1404(a) and 1406.
A. Urgings for Amendment from Others
Practitioners, judges (including those on the Panel), and Congressmen
have identified and called for an amendment of the mandatory remand
procedure established by § 1407 and Lexecon. A "Lexecon fix.., is needed
and would be welcomed by counsel who litigate these complex and
multiparty cases." 151
149 Id. at S8273.
150 Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2005, S. 3734, 109th Cong. (2006)
(stating that the latest major action occurred on July 26, 2006, where it was read twice
and referred to the Senate committee).
151 Stegich & Yates, supra note 132, at 236. In the aviation litigation context, after
Lexecon, MDL courts provide "effective case management, overseeing discovery, ruling
on jurisdictional and remand issues, facilitating settlement negotiations, and making
rulings on the applicability of law." Id. at 232. Defendants commonly use tag-along
procedures to achieve consolidation, but also move simultaneously in the originating
court for permanent transfer to the MDL district under § 1404(a). Id. Litigants would
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Former Chairmen of the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation
William Terrell Hodges and John F. Nangle testified before Congress as to
the necessity for reform of § 1407 to remove the mandatory remand
requirement.15 2 Judge Robert W. Sweet of the Southern District of New York
stated that "Lexecon has substantially eviscerated the practical purposes of
the MDL assignments. After all, pretrial discovery and related proceedings
simply set the stage for ultimate resolution."' 53 The benefits of consolidation
could best be achieved if "the assigned judge [had] the ability to conduct a
consolidated trial on liability. Such a power would greatly enhance the
possibility of settlement, and, most importantly, eliminate the threat of
inconsistent determinations throughout the country."' 154 Senior Judge James
B. Moran of the Northern District of Illinois has considered remand to be a
"meaningless exercise" and recognized that allowing actions to remain in the
transferee district, where the judge has become so familiar with the case, is
best. 155
Even the writers of the Manual for Complex Litigation, members of the
Federal Judicial Center, have recognized that the policy reasons for the pre-
1998 practice remain. 156 The Federal Judicial Center "has long considered it
'[a] major deficiency in MDL procedure... that the [P]anel does not have
statutory authority to transfer cases for trial. "' 1 57
prefer, however, a reform of Lexecon rather than relying on the not-always-available
§ 1404(a) transfer.
152 See supra Part V.
153 Stegich & Yates, supra note 132, at 236 (reciting a letter written by Judge Sweet
and quoted by Judge Nangle).
154 Id.
155 Armstrong v. La Salle Bank, No. 01 C 2963, MDL 1417, 2007 WL 704531, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2007). Senior Judge Moran acknowledged that remand in this case
would be worthless and would merely frustrate judicial economy since the parties would
reconsolidate the cases in the originating district after remand and then move to transfer
them back to the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to § 1404(a) for trial. Id. This case
certified two questions for immediate interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, one of which was to determine "[w]hether the filing of
an amended complaint agreeing to venue and jurisdiction in the transferee
court,... constitutes consent to trial in the transferee court sufficient to overcome the
right to seek remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) and the Supreme Court's decision in
Lexecon..." Id. at *6. The Seventh Circuit has not yet issued an opinion regarding this
question.
156 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 20, § 20.132; supra Part III-A.
157 Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152 (D. Mass. 2006)
(first alteration in original) (quoting THOMAs E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1987)). The Delaventura court concluded that current
multidistrict litigation practice is "seriously flawed" because it proceeds in a manner that
favors defendants. Id. at 159.
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To date, however, no such amendment has been passed. With the
requests for amendment stretching almost a decade, it is time for reform.
B. A Fresh Proposal
There are several reasons why Congress must amend § 1407 to reverse
Lexecon. First, it is odd that the transferee judge, who has so much power
during pretrial proceedings, is then rendered powerless after the pretrial
period. Under current procedure, the transferee judge can recommend to the
Panel that an action be taken, but beyond that, the transferee court-which
has all of the experience with the case and is so familiar with it-cannot do
anything. 158 This anomalous situation does not make sense.
Second, in many cases, the parties go through procedural hurdles after
remand by the Panel to get around Lexecon. 159 For instance, parties often
move for a § 1404(a) transfer from the originating district to the transferee
district after the Panel has remanded the case. 160 The result of the motion is
that the case ends up in the transferee district once again and the trial can be
conducted in that district. This is a waste of time and effort; the ultimate
result is the same as if the Panel did not require remand. This extended
process is more complicated and judicially inefficient.
158 J.P.M.L. RULE OF PROCEDURE 7.6(d), 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). According to the
Panel's Rules, the Panel considers the remand of any transferred action upon the motion
of a party, upon the suggestion of the transferee district court, or upon the Panel's own
initiative. However, "the Panel is reluctant to order remand absent a suggestion of
remand from the transferee district court." Id. Thus, the transferee court's only power in
controlling the case following the pretrial proceedings is recommending to the Panel an
appropriate time for remand.
In applying these rules, the Panel has noted that the "transferee judge is charged with
the day-to-day supervision of centralized pretrial proceedings and, accordingly, has
special insight into the question of whether further coordinated or consolidated
proceedings are likely to be useful." In re Brand-Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2003). Because the transferee judge is so
deeply involved in these proceedings, he or she is in a unique position to determine when
coordinated pretrial proceedings are no longer necessary. For this reason, the Panel relies
on the suggestion of remand of the transferee judge. However, remand ignores the
observation that the transferee judge is in this unique position to fully understand the
case. Remand deprives the transferee judge of his or her experience in the case and
removes this judge from the remainder of the action. It is inefficient to remove an
experienced judge and throw in a new judge (from the originating district) who is
completely unfamiliar with the case and must start from scratch.
159 See supra Part V.
160 See, e.g. Altamont Pharm., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 2002 WL 69495, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 18, 2002).
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Lastly, judges, practitioners, and Congress have recognized that the
current system requires amendment, as many articles have been published
pointing out the flaws and many bills have passed in the House of
Representatives that would amend § 1407. A fresh approach to amending the
statute is necessary, however, and this Note proposes a new idea for
consideration that would encourage reform in a more effective manner.
In amending § 1407 there are certainly competing interests that must be
considered, including judicial efficiency versus the plaintiffs choice of
forum and the power of the transferee judge versus the power of the Panel. It
is both odd and wasteful, however, that transferee judges have so much
power during the pretrial proceedings and that parties may go through several
procedural steps to get around the mandatory remand procedure established
by Lexecon. The rule should be changed back to the pre-Lexecon way that
had worked well for thirty years, where it was common for the transferee
judge to grant motions for self-transfer.
In particular, this Note proposes that Congress amend § 1407 to create a
default procedure where actions transferred by the Panel to a transferee
district for pretrial proceedings are then remanded by the Panel to the
transferor court, similar to the procedure currently in place. The parties and
the transferee court, however, should have the option to allow the transferee
judge to transfer the case under § 1404 or 1406 to either the transferee court
or another court of the parties' choice. This mutual consent on behalf of all
parties involved and the transferee court ensures that the parties are willing to
remain in that district (or be transferred to another district altogether) and can
avoid the procedural hassles to return to that district. It also guarantees that
the transferee court deems it appropriate for that particular action to go to
trial in that court and that the court is capable of adding the case to its
permanent docket.
If the parties wish that the case remain in the transferee district or be
transferred elsewhere, such requests should be accommodated to promote
judicial economy. The parties can stipulate that venue is proper in the district
to where they desire the case be transferred. This mechanism would ensure
that all parties to the action want to be in the transferee or other district and
that the transferee judge deems the transfer to be appropriate in the interests
of efficiency and convenience. If venue is improper in the transferee district,
requiring all parties to stipulate that venue is proper and requiring consent to
trial in that district serve to protect the plaintiffs choice of forum. It is
certainly conceivable that throughout the weeks, months, or years of
discovery in the MDL, a plaintiff may come to realize that the transferee
district, or a district other than the transferor district, is most appropriate for
trial. This amendment would facilitate the achievement of the parties' desire
to transfer venue while also respecting the notions of judicial economy and
preservation of resources.
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Another suggestion for reform of § 1407 is to create legislation that
solely concerns Lexecon and amendment of § 1407. Many of the bills
discussed in Part V, among others suggesting reform of the Lexecon result,
were combined with other legislation that likely received more attention in
the Houses of Congress. As a result, the § 1407 amendment provisions were
not always at the forefront of the bill, and it is certainly plausible that these
provisions were easily removed from the bills in committee in attempts to
compromise over other portions of the bills unrelated to Lexecon.
Streamlining the Lexecon amendment into a single bill where it is the sole
issue within that bill may force Congress to address Lexecon directly instead
of bypassing the Lexecon concerns in favor of other provisions within the
bills.
As fundamental as reform is, there have been criticisms and concerns in
amending § 1407.161 Some of these worries do not even arise under the
proposal contained in this Note, and others are offset by counterbalancing
benefits of remaining in the transferee district for trial. Because this proposal
calms fears about reform, the merits of the proposal are highlighted in that
doubts about reform are removed.
One potential concern with allowing all cases to remain in the MDL
district instead of being remanded by the Panel is that this practice could be
inefficient. With a massive inundation of thousands of cases from the MDL
pretrial proceedings suddenly being added to the permanent docket of the
transferee district, the transferee judges may be unable to give each case its
due attention. 162 The transferee district judge will have such a lengthy docket
that it will take more time to move each case through the litigation
process. 163 Because the judge is so busy, so the concern goes, he may also be
unable or unwilling to focus on the merits of each case, and motions for
summary judgment will be granted less frequently. 164 As such, even more
cases will have to go to trial and further lengthen the list of cases pending for
trial. This concern need not exist if the statute were amended based on the
proposal in this Note. Under this version of amendment, the transferee
district would have to consent to the case remaining in that district for trial.
161 See, e.g., Mark Herrmann, Geoffrey J. Ritts & Brian Ray, Creating Mini MDL-
Statutes, 32 LITIGATION 39, 41-42 (2005); Larson, supra note 38, at 1363-67.
162 Herrmann, Ritts & Ray, supra note 161, at 41. This article addresses the state
versions of § 1407 and important concerns in creating state "mini-MDL statutes." The
article points to many areas in which the state and federal versions are similar and many
in which they are different. The authors provide guidance in drafting mini-MDL
procedures and point out area of concern with MDL practice.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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This requirement of consent would prevent the transferee court from
becoming overly burdened with cases staying in that district for trial.
Another worry about reform is that settlement prospects may not
improve if the cases remain coordinated for trial. Throughout the pretrial
process, the transferee judge has at his or her disposal means by which
reform is encouraged, such as controlling the procedures and pace of
discovery and by refusing to suggest to the Panel to remand a case until the
parties have taken advantage of all settlement opportunities.' 65 It has been
argued that the new judge in the originating district, upon remand, has a fresh
perspective of the case and can bring about new suggestions for
settlement. 166 That the transferor judge may find new ways to encourage
settlement is certainly a realistic argument, but the transferee judge still
knows the case best and is in a fortunate position to be able to review the
history of the settlement negotiations in order to determine what course of
action for achieving settlement is most plausible based on past efforts.
A third concern is the potential for abuse of the plaintiffs choice of
forum that may arise when the parties remain in the transferee district rather
than returning to the transferor district where the plaintiff chose to file the
action.167 This proposal in this Note, however, addresses concerns about the
plaintiffs choice of forum by requiring the plaintiffs consent to remain in
the transferee district rather than being remanded to the transferor district.' 68
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Larson, supra note 38, at 1351-52. Potential fears about disrespecting the
plaintiffs choice of forum include choice of law issues, discriminatory treatment from
judges, and undue prejudice from a jury. Id. at 1352. In one such scenario, plaintiff may
have carefully chosen the district of choice to file the action, and defendant then moved
to consolidate the action under § 1407. If the case were heard in the transferee district, the
court may apply a different law that would lead to "an entirely inappropriate outcome
favoring the defendant, who initially moved for consolidation." Id. Additionally,
according to this author, judges may seek to achieve uniform rather than disparate results,
and in effect disregard the individual circumstances of the plaintiff's case. Id. This author
argues that "there are a number of potential outcome-determinative effects that are likely
to be adverse to the plaintiff who is subject to a consolidated trial. These adverse effects
make the remand mandate all the more crucial to the plaintiffs substantive rights." Id.
These fears, however, are unwarranted under the current proposal, which seeks to
preserve plaintiffs' rights, choices, and interests by ensuring that the plaintiffs would
consent to trial in the transferee district.
168 In addition to plaintiffs' interests being protected by this proposal, it is also true
that "many plaintiffs would not feel the effects of a Lexecon 'fix' since transferee courts
dispose of almost seventy-five percent of all multidistrict litigation cases before trial
through settlement." L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class
Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 203
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After months or years of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,
the plaintiff may come to realize that trial in the transferee district is best.
The plaintiff may become more comfortable in that district or develop a
rapport with the MDL judge, or perhaps the plaintiff may decide that district
is more convenient than originally thought. Choice of law may not be a
major issue in a particular case, and thus a plaintiff may likely choose to
remain in that forum. The vast number of procedures that plaintiffs have
participated in to avoid the Lexecon result suggests that plaintiffs do
sometimes change their minds about the most appropriate forum for trial.
When they do not decide to transfer venue permanently, they are not bound
to such transfer, because they must consent under the proposed amendment
to § 1407. Thus, this proposal respects the plaintiff's choice of forum while
recognizing that a plaintiffs interests may change over the course of
litigation and remaining in the MDL district for trial may become the option
in the best interests of both parties.
While there are reasons for concern based on the thought of reform in
general, these concerns subside in light of the merits of the proposal. The
concerns are counteracted by the benefits of remaining in the MDL district
for trial. This proposal takes account of prior concerns and assures that these
concerns need not be of worry. The current proposal, whereby remand is the
default procedure but parties have the option to consent, with the permission
of the transferee court, to remain in the transferee district for trial,
acknowledges these concerns and promotes means which do not pose a threat
to party autonomy or the continued efficiency of the judicial system.
Ultimately, under the current system, the parties can most often achieve
the goal of having the case heard in the district that they desire or by the
judge that they prefer. The process of getting to that point, however, is
absurd and results in a tremendous waste of time and resources. Because the
parties are eventually able to sidestep the procedural hurdles of Lexecon, it
makes sense simply to remove the obstacles and allow the parties to achieve
their goals more efficiently. Since the overarching purpose of § 1407 and
multidistrict litigation is to promote judicial efficiency and the interests and
convenience of the parties, this amendment will further achieve this purpose
in a logical fashion. With complex cases, the interests of judicial efficiency
make it highly desirable that the transferee judge, who was involved in
pretrial proceedings and is most familiar with the case, hears the trial. This
amendment would satisfy this interest.
(2004). Thus, abuse of plaintiffs would be protected against both under this proposal and
through the common occurrence of disposal of the case before remand anyway.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Multidistrict litigation was designed to create a more efficient procedural
system in mass litigation cases, where hundreds or thousands of actions
involving one or more common questions of fact pending in different
districts can be transferred to a single district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings, in the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
while promoting the just and efficient conduct of these actions.1 69 For the
first thirty years of practice in multidistrict proceedings, transferee courts
frequently granted "self-transfer" motions allowing the cases that were
transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to remain in the
transferee district for trial. This procedure was well-accepted and commonly
employed.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach pointed to the plain language of § 1407 and its legislative
history in holding that this self-transfer was not authorized by the statute, and
any case that had been transferred by the Panel pursuant to § 1407 must be
remanded by the Panel to the transferor court.1 70 After this decision, parties
immediately began devising techniques to avoid the mandatory remand
procedure, and while these tactics are often effective in carrying out the
parties' intent of reaching the proper forum for trial, they are an undue
expense and waste of litigants' and judicial resources. Congress, with the
urgings of many courts and members of the Panel, attempted to pass
legislation that would amend the Lexecon result, but no amendment has been
successfully passed in the ten years since Lexecon.
It is time for reform. To promote judicial efficiency and end this waste of
time and money, Congress should amend § 1407 to create a system where the
default procedure would be for the transferee court to recommend to the
Panel to remand the case to the originating district, but allow litigants the
options to move the transferee court for permanent transfer under § 1404 or
1406. With ten years having passed since the Lexecon decision and each
successive Congress considering but not enacting an amendment, enough is
enough. The 110th Congress should act to mark the end of an era of time-
and resource-consuming tactics to avoid the mandatory remand, and directly
and expressly permit the ultimate result in many multidistrict litigation
actions by allowing the transferee court to decide §§ 1404 and 1406 motions.
169 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
170 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
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